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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In re KOBEKT W. HUGHES
Disciplinary Proceedings
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(
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action wherein Robert W. Hughes, a
member of the Utah State Bar, had disciplinary proceedings commenced against him for a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial
Ethics. Based upon its findings of wrongdoing, the
Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar recommended that Robert W. Hughes be suspended from the
practice of law for the period of one year and thereafter
until Robert W. Hughes shall reimburse the Utah State
Bar for the actual expenses incurred by it in connection
with the disciplinary proceeding. Hughes has appealed
to the Supreme Court for the reduction of that recommended penalty.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Robert W. Hughes is an attorney at law and is a
member of the Utah State Bar. He maintains an office
at 80 West Louise Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, but
spends much of his time outside of the state of Utah
(Tr.6,7).
Hughes and one Frank Bakker formed a corporation known as Little Dutch Girl Bakers, Inc., in about
1971. They each owned 125 shares of stock in said corporation which gave each of them a 50 percent ownership of the corporation at its inception. Hughes became
an officer, director, and was legal counsel for the corporation (Tr. 9). After the formation of the company,
a decision was made to have a public offering of stock
to generate capital to expand the company, and efforts
were made to raise some operating capital prior to filing a regulation A application with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Tr. 20). The amount decided
upon as preregistration capital was $50,000 (Tr. 21).
This was to be accomplished by selling 100,000 shares
of stock at $.50 per share (Tr. 22). Due to underwriting
requirements, Hughes and Bakker were limited to the
number of shares they could own, but Hughes cannot
recall what number of shares they were allowed to retain by the underwriter, but of that he did retain or
was allowed to- retain, he had given up almost all of the
shares he owned (Tr. 23, 24), and had only between
500 and 1,000 shares of stock left to his personal disposal (Tr. 26).
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Hughes started soliciting preregistration subscriptions from several investors. As he would collect monies
from them, he would place those monies in the corporate account (Tr. 31). One exception to that practice was
money he collected from Lee Fong for the purchase of
4,000 shares of stock for which he collected $2,000 and
which he deposited to his own account (Tr. 29-30). He
claimed Bakker had agreed that he could deposit the
$2,000 investment from Fong in his own account to cover
expenses he had incurred in selling stock (Tr. 35), but
Bakker denied that he gave Hughes that authority or
that he even knew Lee Fong had invested money in the
company until several months later when the application for a regulation A registration was returned by
the Securities and Exchange Commission at which time
he saw Lee Fong's name on it for the first time discovered that Lee Fong had invested $2,000 in the Company (Tr. 255).
Hughes also claimed the need for that $2,000 because Bakker had stopped payment on a $1,000 company check that had allegedly been given to him for one
reason or another (Exhibit 2). That check was made
out in all regards by Bakker except for the payee which
Hughes admits he filled in himself (Tr. 36). Bakker
testified that the reason he filled out the check completely with exception of the payee was because neither
he nor Hughes could recall the name of the labor union
fund from whom a loan had been made and who should
receive the money. He did know the union representative's name as Avard Booth, and so indicated that
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on the ledger portion of the check register (Exhibit 17),
but left it up to Hughes to put the name of the union
as the payee when Hughes determined the correct name
of the union to which the loan should be repaid (Tr.
248-255). He had never given Hughes permission to put
his own name in as payee on that check (Tr. 255). The
justification for diverting Lee Fong's $2,000 is, therefore, suspect on its face.
Hughes takes two positions in his testimony concerning the Fong check for $2,000. First, he claims entitlement to the funds because the company owed him
money (Tr. 35), but later claims that the $2,000 he received from Fong never belonged to the company because he was selling Fong some of his own stock and
not company treasury stock (Tr. 41). He claims he sold
Fong 4,000 shares of his own stock, but really only had
either 500 or 1,000 shares of his own stock available for
sale (Tr. 26).
Hughes further confuses the question of whose stock
was sold to Fong for the $2,000 by admitting that he
would have deposited that $2,000 in the company account in the Los Angeles area if he had been going back
to the Los Angeles area after seeing Fong, but because
he was going in another direction on a trip, he decided to
place it in his own account (Tr. 56,137). Before diverting
the $2,000 Fong check for services and expenses, he had
not submitted itemized billings to his client for services
and expenses (Tr. 55).
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Concerning the inclusion of Lee Fong's name on the
notification under regulation A that Hughes filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, (Exhibit
D-13), it should be noted that it has a different type
style than all of the other material on that notification,
and also has a different margin setting. It appears to
have been included sometime after the remainder of the
notification was prepared (Tr. 178-179).
The other portion of the charge that the Bar Commission found that Hughes had committed, in addition
to the foregoing, concerned a matter where Hughes received $1,000 from a client, Gordon Leonard, to settle
some collection judgments that attorney Robert Ryberg
had against Mr. Leonard for some clients that he was
representing. Hughes cannot remember for sure whether
Leonard gave him a thousand-dollar check or $1,000 in
cash. After receiving those funds from Leonard he may
have deposited them in a general account in which he
transacted his everyday affairs, but did not deposit it
in a trust account or some other separate account so
as to avoid commingling funds. About two months after
the Leonard funds were commingled with his own funds
or were otherwise used by him, he wrote a check to Ryberg to settle Leonard's account with Ryberg's clients
which was dishonored by the bank because it exceeded
collected funds in the account at that time. Another
$1,500 check out of another general account was given
to Ryberg sometime ?j,ter in satisfaction of that transaction (Tr. 85-97). Hughes does not dispute the fact
that he did not place his client's money in a separate
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identifiable trust account and admits he either commingled them with his general account or otherwise used
them for his own purposes.

ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BAR COMMISSION ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS ITS
RECOMMENDATION THAT ROBERT W.
HUGHES BE SUSPENDED FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF
ONE YEAR AND THEREAFTER UNTIL
ROBERT W. H U G H E S SHALL REIMBURSE THE UTAH STATE BAR FOR THE
ACTUAL EXPENSES INCURRED BY IT IN
CONNECTION WITH THE DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDING.
Through three days of hearings and 300 pages of
testimony, there was more than ample and sufficient
credible testimony that the hearing officers of the Bar
Commission could rely upon to support their findings.
Those findings, insofar as they are material to this appeal, were that during the months of July and August,
1972, Robert W. Hughes was a promoter and officer
and director of and attorney for Bakker's Little Dutch
Girl Bakeries, Inc. Among his duties as a promoter was
the raising of capital from private investors prior to a
proposed public offering. Among his duties as attorney
was preparation of notification under regulation A for
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On or about August 5, 1972, Robert W. Hughes received
a check from investor Lee Fong in amount $2,000 for
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4,000 shares of the capital stock of Little Dutch Girl
Bakeries. Robert W. Hughes deposited said check in his
personal bank account and used the proceeds to reimburse himself for expenses claimed to have been incurred on behalf of the corporation in promoting private investors to purchase stock prior to said public
offering even though his right to do so was disputed by
his client, and commingled the proceeds of said check with
his personal funds and did not notify Little Dutch Girl
Bakeries of the receipt of said check or maintain a record of said check or render accounts to Little Dutch
Girl Bakeries of his expenses in the promotion of this
sale of a said stock or of the receipt of said check. Those
findings of fact, having to do with Lee Fong investment
in Little Dutch Girl Bakeries are amply supported by
the record, as shown in the preceding statement of facts.
The hearing officers of the Bar Commission were
also justified in their finding of fact that prior to July
9, 1971, Robert W. Hughes received from a client, Gordon Leonard, sums to be delivered to counsel for a person having a judgment against said Leonard. Robert
W. Hughes deposited said amount in his personal account and commingled said amount with his personal
funds and, on or about July 9, 1971, issued a check from
said acount, payable to counsel for said party in amount
$1,500, which check failed to clear as written against
"uncollected funds". Said Robert W. Hughes did not on
July 9, 1971, or on August 5, 1972, maintain a trust account nor did he deposit in one or more identifiable bank
accounts maintained in the state in which his law of7
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fice was situated, funds of his clients without depositing in the same account funds belonging to him. Hughes,
by his own admission, commingled his client's funds on
both the Lee Fong transaction and the Leonard transaction with his own funds.
Based upon its findings of fact, the Bar Commission found that Hughes violated the Provisions of Eule
I I I , Canon 9, D E 9-102 (A) and (B) (1) and (3) by applying funds of his client to his own use when his right
to do so was disputed by his client and in failing to
maintain the funds of his client in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which
his law office was situated and in depositing his funds
in accounts in which client's funds were deposited, and
in failing to notify his client of the receipt of that
client's funds and in failing to maintain records of funds
of a client coming into his possession and rendering
appropriate accounts to his client regarding them. The
verbatum provisions of Canon 9 that were violated as
follows:
D E 9-102: Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client.
(A)

All funds of a client paid to a lawyer or law
firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more
identifiable bank accounts maintained in
the state in which the law office is situated
and no funds belonging to the lawyer or
law firm shall be deposited therein except
as follows :
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(B)

(1)

Funds reasonably sufficient to pay
bank charges may be deposited therein.

(2)

Funds belonging part to a client and
in part presently or potentially to
the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may
be withdrawn when due unless the
right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in
which event the disputed portion shall
not be withdrawn until the dispute is
finally resolved.

A lawyer shall:
(1)

Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other
properties.

(3)

Maintain complete r e c o r d s of all
funds, securities, and other properties
of a client coming into the possession
of the lawyer and render appropriate
accounts to his client regarding them.

As was set out in the statement of facts, and as is
apparent in reading the transcript of the proceedings,
there is some conflict in the evidence as to whether
Hughes was selling his own stock to Fong when he sold
Fong 4,000 shares for the payment of $2,000, or whether
he was selling treasury stock from the corporation. The
conflict in the testimony is, however, only in the different versions of it that Hughes testified to. Insofar as
the testimony from Mr. Bakker was concerned, Hughes
did not have authority to divert the $2,000 to his own
9
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use, and as a matter of fact, the corporation was in dire
straits at that time and critically needed the capital to
remain in operation.
Even though Hughes attempts to justify the diversion of that $2,000 because the company owed him expense money, his entitlement to those funds must be
handled in accordance with the Code of Professional
Eesponsibility in Canons of Judicial Ethics, which all of
the testimony clearly shows he violated in the manner
in which he handled the $2,000 he received from Lee
Pong. He admittedly had never rendered a billing to
his client and, according to the testimony of Mr. Bakker
and Mr. Monson, he never notified them of the Lee Fong
investment, and they only found out about it after the
regulation A application was returned by the Securities and Exchange Commission several months after
Hughes had taken the $2,000 from Lee Fong and diverted it into his own account.
Appellant would ask the court to believe that there
was no attempt to conceal the fact that Fong was a
stockholder, however, that contention must be weighed
in the light of all of the evidence. That evidence is that
neither Bakker nor Monson were advised that Fong
was an investor, his name ivas included on the regulation A application at sometime other than when the
major portion of that application was prepared and
signed by Mr. Bakker, and that it was placed on the
regulation A application at the bottom of the page by
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the use of a different typewriter than had been used to
type the remainder of the application, and had margins
incorrectly set. Also, the money was not deposited in
the company account and a check drawn for expenses
by Hughes, even though Hughes had authority to write
checks on the company account.
Hughes concedes the fact that he commingled client's
funds with his own and did not render an appropriate
account to the company (Appellant's Brief, page 7), but
he attempts to justify his actions by claiming he did
more work in promoting the company than did Bakker
and Monson, and that Bakker and Monson were reimbursed for some of their expenses. While Hughes may
have had some entitlement to the corporate monies, the
manner in which he exercised control over the company's
property is what is suspect and is what constitutes the
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Hughes also concedes that he commingled the Leonard funds with his own, and in the transcript of the
proceedings, the indication isj that possibly it was more
than commingling of funds in that instance, and he admitted that he may have merely spent the funds given
him by his client, and then tried to cover them at a
later date out of his general account. Either way that
transaction came about, it admittedly was an improper
transaction and in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics.
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The appellant does not specifically challenge the
validity of the findings of fact made by the bar commissioners, but urges that the facts are a little different
than they were found to be by the Commissioners. This
court has, on several occasions, set out the standard by
which it will consider the bar commission's findings of
fact. In E e Fullmer, 17 U.2d 121, 405 P.2d 343, the
Court stated:
"The review of that proceeding in this Court
is not like an ordinary appeal or administrative
review because the order to be made is a responsibility of this court. Nevertheless, this Court is
disposed to follow the same pattern generally
and to look upon the findings and the recommendation of the Bar Commission with indulgence;
and not to disregard its action lightly, nor at all,
unless there was something to pursuade this Court
that the Commission has acted capriciously or
arbitrarily or beyond the scope of its powers, or
is plainly in error."
In Ee Wade, 27 U.2d 410, 497 P.2d 22, the Court reaffirmed that position and stated:
"This Court is committed to the proposition
that the findings of the Board of Commissioners
be accepted as the facts of the case unless it appears that the Board has acted capriciously or
arbitrarily or went beyond its powers".
The appellant on page 9 of his brief, basically concedes that the findings of fact and decision of the Bar
Commission are reasonably supported by the evidence
and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The appellant
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feels, however, that even with those findings of fact that
no punishment at all should be given for the violations,
or that a greatly reduced punishment would be more appropriate.
In the Fullmer case, previously cited, the attorney
wrongfully converted his client's money to his own use,
and the Bar Commission recommended a three-year suspension from the practice of law as the appropriate
punishment. The Supreme Court adopted the Bar Commission's recommendation and required the attorney to
take a three-year suspension from the practice of law.
In the Wade case, the attorney was found guilty of
neglecting to attend to his client's affairs and in failing
to maintain complete records of a client's funds, securities, and properties which were entrusted to him and in
failing to account to the client therefore. The Bar Commission recommended a two-year suspension which suspension was ordered by the Supreme Court.
The actions of Mr. Hughes in this case are quite
analogous to those in the Fullmer case and the Wade
case, and considering the fact that Mr. Hughes is guilty of two separate violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, the oneyear suspension would appear to be warranted, and sufficiently mild to adequately reprimand Mr. Hughes for
his unprofessional conduct. It could be argued that the
one-year suspension is not harsh enough punishment for
the two violations, and would tend to show the bar commissioners hearing the case were very compassionate in
only recommending a one-year suspension.
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CONCLUSIONS
It is respectfully submitted that the Bar Commission's recommendation be adopted and that Mr. Hughes
be required to take a one-year's suspension from the
practice of law, with the suspension to become effective
upon the issuance of the remittitur.
Respectfully submitted,
WENDELL E. BENNETT
Suite 100 John Hancock Building
455 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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